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ABSTRACT  The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC),(1) which has 
long been a leading reference case in transitional justice (TJ), has recently become a focus 
again in research into post-TJ social change. While its beginnings mainly focus on practical 
questions of success or failure for each TJ case, TJ studies have moved to more local-oriented 
topics, such as politics, perceptions, and reactions by local actors. This paper sets its analytical 
direction in this vein, starting to review the TRC in probing the conflictive motivations and 
actions of political stakeholders during the TRC’s active period. Being affected by such local 
politics, the TRC could not achieve what it held as official objectives. Incompleteness in the 
TRC’s outcomes has naturally been criticised by observers, yet after the end of the official 
programme, the incompleteness would turn into a catalyst for new movements by civil society 
actors. We incorporate the concept of propagation of movement repertoire from social move-
ment theory to understand the unexpected legacy of the TRC and draw the current social ac-
tions that spontaneously suture the incompleteness of the TRC’s activities. 
Key Words: Incompleteness; Transitional justice; Truth and Reconciliation Commission; 
Memory politics; Propagation of movement repertoire.
INTRODUCTION
Twenty years ago, one of the authors had been serving on the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission (TRC) of South Africa as an officer for Investigation 
Unit. Another had just begun his fieldwork on the TRC in Cape Town. After 
completion of his mission, the investigating officer published Jakaranda Time 
(Khoisan, 2001), sketching ethnographic episodes about his investigation, particu-
larly of the hard-nosed former apartheid authority. The other author submitted his 
dissertation in 2003 on the sociological analysis of social reconciliation of South 
African transition. The authors then thought that they published what they could 
analyse on the TRC, while not having known how the impact of the TRC would 
appear in the future. 
Authorized by the TRC Act (Promotion of National Unity and Reconcilia-
tion Act, No. 34 of 1995), the TRC collected testimony from 22,000 people, 
received the 7,100 applications for amnesty, and held 365 public hearings(1) 
in five years beginning 1996. The commission published the final volume of 
the official report in 2003. Since then, the TRC has become one of the lead-
ing cases of transitional justice (TJ) programmes, cited repeatedly when any 
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new TJ project was planned in any country. 
While many practitioners, as well as students in university courses, have dealt 
with the South African TRC as if it were a textbook positive example—‘it con-
tributed toward national reconciliation through victim healing’—critical analyses 
on it have been accumulating from many scholars (Carranza, 2008; Doxtader & 
Villa-Vicencio, 2004; Graybill, 2002; Mamdani, 2009; van der Merwe, 2003; 
Nuttall & Coetzee, 1998; Pigou, 2002; Posel, 2002; van der Merwe & Chapman, 
2008; Wilson, 2001). However, as a possible policy option in a post-conflict or 
democratising country, the TRC seems to have served as a typical template for 
other cases, although critiques have always warned that the TRC posing as a 
one-size-fits-all manual would not be productive. 
Both authors have thus watched South African social change since their former 
work was completed, wondering if they could catch a visible sign of the TRC’s 
legacy, with a mixed memory of expectation and disappointment at the time of 
TRC activities; yet the sign has recently appeared in an unforeseeable manner.
In the meantime, the TRC has been a focus again in the framework of TJ 
studies, in light of post-TJ influence. Kesselring (2017) argues about the memory 
politics in the post-TRC South Africa, inquiring about overt and covert relation-
ships between civil society activities and the TRC. As such, the agenda-setting 
with the TRC would not simply be outdated in a current context, when re-con-
textualising it under the viewpoint of the legacy of the TJ in a post-TJ phase. 
The TRC has come to the forefront of TJ studies on this point. 
When considering diverse social responses to any policy, one needs to expand 
his/her view over the influence of the policy even in a form which was unex-
pected. Such unexpected form can take up a guise that becomes visible gradually 
in the course of changing social circumstances after the end of the policy. Put 
differently, we are invited to take another avenue of thinking beyond a simple 
success/failure debate.
For that purpose, this article adopts the following basic questions as a starting 
point: what social groups projected what framework to the TRC during its active 
period, rather than sticking to an authentic one: what did the TRC achieve in 
responding to its official objective? Put another way, we will explore the primary 
responsive pattern of the local political stakeholders to the TRC, particularly on 
how they perceived the human-rights-inclined truth-seeking with other motivations 
to be reflected for their own purposes. As we refer to the past comparative cases 
such as in Serbia, Cambodia, and Sierra Leone on this issue, local strategic per-
ception of TJ principle has been one of major topics in the recent landscape of 
this research area. Many scholars have increasingly realised that TJ’s idealistic 
objectives are often ill-matched to the social circumstances and the need to rec-
ognise transitional status with more focus on local politics. 
Adopting an approach which examines diverse external actors outside a TJ 
entity, also including subversive ones, is significant because the frequent linger-
ing conflict during and after the implementation of the TJ programme has often 
been rooted in the context in which the TJ project was established and executed. 
Based on that viewpoint, this article then introduces the indirect influences of the 
TRC’s work on other movements, searching for a perspective which allows us to 
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grasp a linkage between the TJ programme and the post-TJ social action. Such 
an influence is indirect and informal—at least, unplanned in the TRC’s roadmap 
—and is rather well captured with an expression of spontaneous divergence by 
each initiative. Although many locals and observers have expected positive out-
comes at the initial stage, many criticisms of the TRC’s unfinished business have 
been added (Bell & Ntsebeza, 2003).(2) The critical arena of contestation has been 
the victims and survivors of apartheid era abuses seeking information on what 
the TRC uncovered, for the purpose of pursuing rights abuses not provided amnesty 
or who did not apply for amnesty for apartheid era crimes. However, in incor-
porating the term propagation of repertoires, this paper argues that such a link-
age between the TJ programme and the post-TJ social action would be traced in 
a consistent manner. The latter half of this article thus aims to suggest a theo-
retical understanding of a TJ initiative which may include positive actions that 
diverge from the TRC’s incomplete official activities.
RE-CONTEXTUALISING THE SOUTH AFRICAN CASE IN THE CURRENT 
TJ STUDIES
I. From Assessing an Achievement of a Goal to Recognition of Diverse Politics
 
Scholarly evaluation of the TRC has tended to be negative. The patterns of 
criticism have ranged from the limitation of TRC’s mandate (Carranza, 2008; 
Mamdani, 2009) and not developing close relationships with these local NGOs 
(van der Merwe, 2003: 110–112; van der Merwe & Chapman, 2008) to passive 
acceptance or indifference of local people. The former includes that the victims 
of police violence in terms of pass laws were eliminated from the victim cate-
gory. The latter reminds us of the general withdrawal of Indian people from the 
process (Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 1998: 168). Simply put, those 
criticisms have pointed to what the TRC could not include even though it was 
expected to reach the issue and the people (Abe, 2014). 
On the other hand, the following section will pay more attention to the people 
who positively tried to engage in the process. The focus on those who sometimes 
have their own strategic agendas to the TJ scenario has been one of the conten-
tious issues in the field. We will follow this trend briefly. 
In particular, the politicians in a transitional society have often been observed 
to be fluid figures, who attempt to affect the process with their own political 
motivations, which are different from TJ’s official objective. 
For instance, Sierra Leonean politicians were assessed as trying to control their 
political hegemony against rivals through the process of internationalised hybrid 
tribunals, which have been chosen in Sierra Leone’s post-conflict phase. Accord-
ing to Gerhard Anders, despite Chief Prosecutor Crane’s rousing statements that 
‘we mean business’ and ‘no one is above the law,’ the Special Court—which 
contains the term ‘Extraordinary’ in its name—and the TRC ‘were, in fact, not 
extraordinary from the perspective of political and military leaders who were 
doing business as usual, trying to outmanoeuvre their rivals in spite of grand 
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announcements of a new beginning’ (Anders, 2014: 525, 527). He used the expres-
sion ‘business as usual’ to represent a strategy ‘to convert their military strength 
into political and economic capital after the end of the war’ (Anders, 2014: 540). 
The use of the expression is apt, as this case also demonstrates the strategic util-
isation of TJ, or TJ discourse, by local political elites facing pressure to accept 
an internationalised TJ initiative.
Similarly, the Cambodian government appealed to the UN in 1997 to establish 
an international tribunal to try the former Khmer Rouge (KR) cadres. However, 
it swiftly changed its stance in 1998 when some of the KR leaders surrendered 
because the need to utilise foreign resources and devices to affect the domestic 
politics diminished. Rejecting the UN’s request to settle in an international court, 
it even withdrew from a negotiation with the UN task force on the institutional 
form of the hybrid tribunals. 
Reluctantly following the Cambodian government’s unilateral action to set the 
law on the tribunals, the UN agreed to the launch of the Extraordinary Chambers 
in the Court of Cambodia (ECCC) in 2006. However, throughout the 11-years of 
operation with overt or covert governmental intervention, as of April 2017, the 
ECCC has just delivered one final judgement. Leading legal scholars on the ECCC 
reached the point where they charged that the ECCC was a flawed institution 
which had ‘damaged the UN’s reputation’ (Ciociari & Heindel, 2014). 
In the same vein but with more spectacular guise, Serbian politicians’ strategic 
move in the negotiation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) showed a more dazzling example of political manoeuvring of 
judiciary. Consider the case of Slobodan Milošević(3) who was charged by the 
ICTY with war crimes. At first, Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Ðindīć justified 
Milošević’s arrest and extradition with highly pragmatic expressions such as an 
‘entrance ticket to the democratic world,’ taking the position that ‘refusal to extra-
dite Milošević would lead to the suspension of financial aid, which would bring 
the country to the brink of economic collapse, complicate the repayment of for-
eign debt, and prevent Serbia’s membership in international financial institutions’ 
(Subotić, 2009: 47). The Serbian government thus followed a policy of dualism: 
cooperation with the ICTY on one hand for pragmatic purposes, while distancing 
itself from justice norms in its local communications. Justice was not a transcen-
dent ideal but just a convenient or expedient political choice to advance a secu-
lar agenda. The Serbian government later invented the term ‘voluntary surrenders’ 
to enhance this dualism. 
The situation actually became quite farcical, even though international society 
had to formally accept Serbia’s compliance: 
Another member of the group of four generals, Vladimir Lazarević, had an 
even more VIP send-off. After deciding to surrender, Lazarević was met by 
the patriarch of the Serbian Orthodox Church and Prime Minister Koštunica, 
who both praised Lazarević’s heroic decision. Koštunica went so far as to 
say that “the general acted in line with a long-standing tradition of the Ser-
bian army, namely, that our officers fight for the interests of the people and 
country until the bitter end” (Subotić, 2009: 50).
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TJ programmes have thus been accepted as a source of politics despite main-
taining a surface appearance under the banner of justice and human rights. Fur-
ther, the generation of a new type of local politics can even be recognised as a 
usual influence of TJ implementation. This is obviously the framework to under-
stand a TJ programme beyond the success-or-failure debate. Rather, it realises 
tension and strategy overtly and covertly, working in and outside the routine of 
official programme. 
Yet, partly because of the symbolic figure of the South African TRC in an 
international context and its novelty to the framework of post-conflict policy, an 
understanding that the TRC could be a juncture of local political strategy, which 
was ‘business as usual,’ has not been typical in past literature (Boraine, 2001; 
Gibson, 2004; Hayner, 2001). The next section will deal with this issue through 
the eyes of former TRC investigation officer. Various actors to the TRC have not 
just complained about the process, but have attempted to manoeuvre and affect 
its orientation. Such manoeuvre and engagement would bring various unexpected 
tasks to the TRC, taking it to the point at which unfinished business remains in 
terms of its official ideal/objective, such as national reconciliation, victim healing 
and thorough fact-finding. These actors will be traced in three categories, namely, 
the primary partners in the negotiations process, the transitional take-over or 
change-management group, and dissenter groups.
II. South African Compromiso Historico, the Primary Partners in the Negotiations 
Process
The TRC had primarily been planned and implemented by a school of thought 
that maintained the TRC was a necessary process to get past the biggest stum-
bling block, the apartheid state and all its lethal instruments, which prevented the 
democratic forces from access to power and a paradigm shift in social relations. 
This school held the view that the only way across the impasse was negotiations, 
through which a blood bath could be avoided and through which horse-trading 
of interests could be managed, allowing a transition to a more democratic and 
representative state that would broadly be able to deliver a better life to the 
majority of South Africans. 
Proponents of this school included the authors of the South African 
Compromiso Historico,(4) the primary partners in the negotiations process. This 
group was represented by people such as Nelson Mandela, Dullah Omar and 
Kader Asmal of the African National Congress (ANC), the majority of captains 
of industry, and, to a certain degree, prominent Afrikaner leaders on the final 
watch of the apartheid state such as F.W. De Klerk.
This scenario made it possible for the ANC majority government to ascend to 
power through the ballot box, for a world-renowned Constitution and Bill of 
Rights to be authored and codified into law, and for significant social, economic, 
and political transformations to be effected. Whereas people in South Africa could 
have inherited a desert, with a destroyed economic and industrial infrastructure 
and a massive body count of innocents in an escalated war, for the constituents 
of this group, South Africa was able to make the dramatic shift to democracy 
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relatively peacefully. Furthermore, this school presented the view that the TRC, 
as a critical handmaiden of this process, provided the most effective change instru-
ment by serving as a neutral platform through which the excesses and gross 
abuses of human rights that characterised the militarised political conflict of the 
last three decades prior to democracy could be ventilated. 
One can reflect several roots of this reconciliation policy going back to the 
points such as the convention for a democratic South Africa (CODESA)’s con-
cern about ‘how to deal with the past in a way that would break the cycles of 
violence, bring about social cohesion, and restore peace’ (Gobodo-Madikizela 
2003: 148) and the Multi-Party Negotiating Process that convened in 1993 after 
the former’s end and resulted in creation of the post-amble of interim constitu-
tion in 1993, which said: ‘The pursuit of national unity, the well-being of all 
South African citizens and peace require reconciliation between the people of 
South Africa and the reconstruction of society (…) In order to advance such rec-
onciliation and reconstruction, amnesty shall be granted in respects of acts, omis-
sions and offences associated with political objectives and committed in the course 
of the conflicts of the past.’ Erik Doxtader emphasises the contentious situation 
until the last moment of implementation over the TRC’s design, mandate and 
power, recalling ‘the fact that individuals and organisations from all sides of the 
political spectrum voiced serious objections to the draft legislation’ (Doxtader, 
2009: 256–257). 
Yet it served as a counterpoint to the call for retribution and revenge and to 
the serious demand for convening Nuremberg-type trials. Its foundational man-
date, laid out in the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 
1995, provided, the constituents of this group argued, a dignified space through 
which a national victim narrative could be recorded and appropriate mechanisms 
for perpetrator declarations set up, and the necessary vehicle through which a 
reparations process could be enacted. Through this process, this school had prop-
agated the impression that the transition from apartheid to democracy was a suc-
cess, that the most disturbing excesses of the past were captured in a compre-
hensive national record, that victims were able to bring their pain and scars to 
the nation’s attention, that perpetrators were called to provide answers for the 
abuses they committed, that several legitimately received amnesties for their dis-
closure, and that victims received compensation for the abuses they suffered. This 
group, for the most part, insisted that there had been a significant accounting to 
history; that the narrative of excesses and wrong-doing had been captured for 
posterity; and that the time had come to move on, leave the past in the past—or 
in the museums and history books through an adequate social device—build the 
country, and enjoy the fruits of democracy.
The primary players articulating the case for a TRC as a way forward in deal-
ing with the histories that preceded the post-apartheid democratic state were 
Nelson Mandela and F.W. De Klerk. In his submission to the TRC De Klerk 
argued:
Throughout the negotiations that resulted in the 1993 Constitution it was 
the understanding amongst the parties that amnesty will be provided for in 
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legislation in line with agreements that had been reached during the pro-
cess of negotiations. Those agreements and understandings secured the nego-
tiated constitutional settlement that resulted in the peaceful transformation 
that we have experienced over the last number of years … Lasting solu-
tions to complex problems can be found only through peaceful means, 
through compromise and through the accommodation of the reasonable inter-
ests and concerns of others.(5)
Nelson Mandela’s position, on why the TRC process was conceived and brought 
into existence is best reflected when he received the first TRC report in October 
1998. Pertinently, in this statement, Mandela refers to a pact that had been devel-
oped prior to the advent of democracy:
Out of that negotiation process emerged a pact to uncover the truth, the 
better to build a bright future … It will be difficult for the victims of gross 
violations of human rights to accept the philosophical account of the trade-
off between punitive justice and a peaceful transition … Consequently, the 
Report that today becomes the property of our nation should be a call to 
all of us to celebrate and to strengthen what we have done as a nation as 
we leave our terrible past behind us forever.(6) 
Their scenarios of political transition were well illustrated in the following 
comments. ‘The Truth and Reconciliation Commission should be the final cathar-
tic dam-burst, unleashing tides of reconstruction’ (Asmal et al., 1996: 208). The 
chief negotiator of the National Party (NP) during the transitional period, Roelf 
Meyer, who had managed the whites’ position in negotiations with the former 
ANC secretary-general, Cyril Ramaphosa, addressed this stance in a remarkably 
clear manner: ‘We had moved away from apartheid. We, who were responsible 
for apartheid, are now saying that we want to leave that wrong behind. We are 
saying that we are sorry. We are also saying, however, that we are now deter-
mined to rectify what went wrong (Roelf Meyer, Debates of Parliament 
(Hansard), 5th Session- 9th Parliament, 17 December 1993. col. 152296-7).’ The 
idea was that the TRC as a political ritual (Bozzoli, 1998; Ross, 1997) suited the 
scenario and political action of this group. 
Yet we also need to remember that some prominent leaders in this category 
would later change the tone of their presentation on the TRC, or have used these 
positive expressions with a strategic twist. Desmond Tutu, the TRC chairperson, 
once said that South Africans would accomplish reconciliation, but later changed 
his orbit: ‘It is crucial to underscore that it was meant to promote not to achieve 
those worthwhile objectives’ (Tutu, 1999: 126). Mandela was more strategic from 
the beginning. In the middle of political negotiations in 1993, he noted that ‘South 
Africans should never forget the crimes committed in their name. We, however, 
know that we must forgive.’(7) ‘[K]eeping negotiations on track’ (Doxtader, 2009: 
206) with such a double-message, he and his colleagues had implemented the 
scenario of Compromiso Historico at the stage of political transition. On the sur-
face, the scenario can be read as a peace pact among the then political elites, 
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which was, however, invisible in the contentious public arena. 
Yet the stance of this school needs to be accepted more cautiously. For instance, 
take a look at Mandela’s speech at the publication ceremony of the TRC report 
in October 1998: ‘Many of us will have reservations about aspects of what is 
contained in these five volumes. All are free to make comment on it and indeed 
we invite you to do so. … The Commission was not required to muster a defin-
itive and comprehensive history of the past three decades.’(8)  What does this mes-
sage mean in essence? How should we accept its meaning? Is it an indirect 
expression designed to cover or explain away undesirable outcomes? Although 
the message with double-meaning has long been criticised as a realisation of 
insufficient policy on urgent matters such as social disparity and redistribution of 
social and economic resources, it would also serve as underground water for 
future propagation of ideas on truth and reconciliation by another entity than the 
TRC, as we will see in the following section.
III. The Transitional Take-over or Change-Management Group
Then there is another group, which can broadly be characterised as the transi-
tional take-over or change-management group. The change-management techno-
crats were the ones responsible for the day-to-day management of the affairs and 
functions of the transitional state, and as such were duty-bound to uphold the 
law, while simultaneously using the bureaucracy to stonewall the objectives laid 
out by the TRC Act.
This group, while not actively manifesting its position publicly during and after 
the TRC, coalesced as a defensive bodyguard against any attempt to demonstrate 
the role, for instance, of intelligence operatives who were liberation movement 
leaders, while simultaneously being paid agents of the apartheid government. This 
group included Thabo Mbeki, then Deputy President, and Trevor Manuel, then 
Finance Minister, as well as prominent political, military, and business leaders 
from among the primary protagonists in the political conflict. For instance, the 
remarkable reaction by Mbeki to the ideal of TRC was well-illustrated in his 
parliamentary speech in May 1998 on reconciliation and nation-building: ‘A major 
component of the issue of reconciliation and nation-building is defined by and 
derives from the material conditions in our society which have divided our coun-
try into two nations, the one black and the other white. We therefore make bold 
to say that South Africa is a country of two nations.’(9) Obviously, it was the 
statement made during the work of the TRC and did not hide any nuance of 
criticism to the commission’s work. Against the politics of compromise by the 
elder ANC cadres, which resonated with the TRC’s reconciliatory orientation as 
well as the post-apartheid racial policy of the rainbow nation, the Mbeki govern-
ment was characterised by ‘a return to race,’ which dealt with ‘economic inequal-
ity rooted in past racial practices’ (Harris, 2004: 3). 
This group, which weighted economic issues more heavily than a symbolic and 
ideal racial relationship, was also responsible for ensuring a relatively efficient 
and peaceful handover of the levers of power, that the agreements from the nego-
tiations table were implemented, and that the turbulence associated with a change 
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of guard was minimised or effectively managed. Yet a critical component of this 
group’s work entailed facilitating trade liberalisation, privatisation, and transna-
tional demands of monopoly capital, all of them were deployed outside the TRC 
arena. Although Mbeki’s two nations speech’ (Harris, 2004: 3), the retrospective 
probe into this group’s economic policy indicated it favoured the business giants:
By 1996, a neoliberal macro-economic policy was formally adopted. From 
1998 to 2001, the ANC government granted permission to South Africa’s 
biggest companies—Anglo American, DeBeers, Old Mutual, South African 
Breweries, Didata, Investec—to move their financial headquarters and pri-
mary stock market listings to London (Bond, 2010: 2–3).
Besides ascendant President Thabo Mbeki and Manuel, this group contained a 
strong contingent of present and former cabinet ministers associated with security 
and intelligence functions. It also included much of the new and old command 
and control of the security instruments of the state and also specific strata of 
emerging and establishment capital. 
There are numerous examples of how this group used its proximity and phys-
ical access to the instruments and levers of power to hamstring the work of the 
TRC, including preventing or intervening in raids to access documents, as also 
the release of the necessary funds required for the TRC to execute its mandate 
under the Act, then, very specifically, ensuring that the military hierarchy of the 
former apartheid government, as also the command structures of the ANC, be 
insulated, through legal and political manoeuvres from intensive investigation and 
scrutiny or from prosecution. There was a confluence of actions from various ele-
ments in this group, but most dramatically from the Mbeki government, which 
sought, on the eve of its release, to interdict the release of the TRC final report, 
in opposing the TRC’s ‘misrepresentation’ on the ANC in gross human rights 
violations during the fight against apartheid.(10) Prior to its release on 29 October 
1998, the TRC Final Report was the subject of two court challenges in the Cape 
High Court. The first came from former President F.W. de Klerk; the second, 
filed by the ANC, came just hours before the report was scheduled to go public. 
Ruling in favour of de Klerk, the court forced the commission to blank out a 
section implicating the former president as ‘an accessory after the fact’ in two 
bombings. In the case of the ANC, Justice W.J. Thring ruled against the applica-
tion, which requested that the report’s release be put on hold until the party and 
the TRC could meet to discuss the findings.
This group, including Department of Justice (DOJ), National Intelligence Agency 
(NIA), and National Archives,(11) also served as the gatekeeper of information 
during the TRC process. This group was behind the enmasse movement of the 
entire TRC archive to a special section of the national archives, which resides 
within the mandate of and is supervised by the Department of Justice. David 
Forbes, the filmmaker who produced the award-winning film on the Cradock 4, 
the South African History Archives, TRC victims organisation Khulumani and 
numerous have had to approach the court to access TRC records. The issue that 
clearly arises is whether the department of Justice, which was given custody of 
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the TRC files, was the most appropriate institution to take control of the files 
that were moved to a special section of the national archives. Further, the prob-
lems were compounded because the department of justice then built a relation-
ship with the intelligence services who were roped in to classify the files. In the 
process numerous critical parts of documents were redacted.(12) The narrative of 
numerous challenges on what happened to 46 boxes of sensitive TRC documents(13) 
has also revealed a type of siege mentality around free and unhindered access to 
this trove of information about a nation’s rendezvous with evil.
IV. Dissenter Groups
The third group consisted of those who did not participate in the TRC process 
or sought through legal and political challenges to interdict the TRC Founding 
Act. This group was represented by, among others, the family of the late Steve 
Biko, the family of Jeanette Schoon,(14) and the Azanian Peoples Organisation 
(AZAPO), which were all engaged in unsuccessful attempts to hold back the TRC 
transitional justice project. Their contentions and concerns as laid out in their 
arguments before court would only be justified and backed with evidence later. 
The victim compensation determination, the non-prosecution of perpetrators denied 
amnesty, and the lack of political will to enforce a more thorough-going process 
are clear indications that their challenges may have been justified. Although the 
member of the former security police confessed their covert actions to Steve Biko, 
Biko’s family objected to giving amnesty to the perpetrators, opining that the 
TRC was a vehicle for political expediency and had robbed them of their right 
to justice,(15) and brought this issue to the Constitutional Court. This group largely 
revealed a deep scepticism that the TRC project would open a process for mean-
ingful review of the period of abuse and have significant change-making impact.
This category also included ‘securocrats,’ who were the functionaries and on-
the-ground perpetrators during the 34 years of rights abuses in the conflict that 
the TRC had to investigate,(16) report on, issue reparations for, make findings on, 
and recommendations about. The term ‘securocrats’ means such units of the for-
mer apartheid government as the State Security Council, the Intelligence Coordi-
nating Committee (abbreviated as ‘KIK’ in Afrikaans), the Civil Cooperation 
Bureau (CCB), the Counter Revolutionary Intelligence Task Team, the Security 
Police, Vlakplaas (C-Section),(17) the Special Forces, Military Intelligence, the 
National Intelligence Service (NIS), the Directorate Covert Collections (DCC), 
and Joint Operational Centres (JOCs). Many of these securocrats simply evaded 
the process, refused to apply for amnesty, laid low, faded from sight, or did 
everything in their power not to cooperate with the TRC.
For instance, when the investigative unit of the TRC went to the Youngsfield 
military base with a warrant to search for seizure and interrogation on the issue 
of violent snipers who had patrolled the townships with police and the murders 
of activists during the 1980s, the first reaction of those military officers who had 
no interest in as well as information on the TRC work was just surprise. Then, 
they obviously attempted to close any door of the structure to the commission, 
with no feasibility to cooperate with it. 
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Colonel Langley and Colonel Gouws were seriously opposed to what we 
were doing … One Major Genis flew into an office that I was in the mid-
dle of searching and demanded that this operation come to an immediate 
halt. ‘Here is the warrant,’ I said to her. ‘If you have any problems go and 
speak to the magistrate.’ ‘You cannot just come in here and search a mil-
itary base whenever you feel like it! ... I will have to speak to the general. 
And I can tell you, you won’t be allowed to search any further.’ … In a 
rage the major informed me that the names of informers are classified 
because ‘these people may still be working.’ But that’s exactly why we 
need them. (Khoisan, 2001: 27). 
In its messy conflict between the TRC investigative unit and the military offi-
cers, the negotiation between the top cadres of the TRC and the South African 
National Defence Force was held, and the agreement was that ‘all requests for 
military documents, personnel records, interviews with military people or searches 
of military installations, would be filtered through a specifically appointed person’ 
(Khoisan, 2001: 28), which was no doubt disappointing to the investigators and 
was accepted as ‘one of [TRC’s] worst mistakes’ (Khoisan, 2001: 28). 
The typical perceptions of these personnel was expressed by the former man-
aging director of the CCB, Colonel Joe Verster, in a TRC public hearing in 1998, 
even after three years of the commission’s operation. Although the CCB had been 
targeted by several investigation commissions prior to the TRC, the fact that it 
operated under the banner of the Special Forces section of the South African 
Defence Force was not revealed. When Verster appeared before the commission, 
he boldly stated his distrust of it, representing the securocrats: 
This morning I came here and what happened afterwards is that there is 
no equality here, there is no democracy, there is no truth. There is no truth 
while my white skin is providing the facts … There are thousands of peo-
ple who feel exactly the same way as I do, that is the current view of 
moderate people who have never seen any signs of real negotiations which 
have addressed the needs of soldiers and people who acted in covert way 
in the past … I want you to understand very, very clearly that I am totally 
opposed to what has just happened here (Section 29 hearing, 18 August 
1997). 
This was the statement uttered one year before the TRC official report was 
published, and it can still be observable that the mentality of these people did 
not change from that in the old regime or, rather, they hardened their stance 
against the ongoing reconciliatory politics. While their stance was almost one of 
resignation, or retirement from the official process, once they were in a stage, 
they turned to be aggressive open critiques. 
V. Beyond Recognising Politics around the Official Truth-seeking Project
What do these politics on truth demonstrate? How can we identify the incom-
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pleteness of the official project that resulted partly from each politics? Although 
the TRC was organised around highly ideal objectives, it had entailed negative 
inputs from various social groups from the preparatory stage to the end of the 
mandate period, including the ones aggressively attempting to change the ambit 
of ‘how reconciliation is realised in public.’ 
Firstly, the primary writer of the scenario of political transition, the school of 
Compromiso Historico, could not sufficiently respond to the people’s eagerness 
for justice. The former head of the research unit of the TRC introduced the notion 
of restorative justice in explaining the possible perspective of the TRC towards 
victims’ needs (Villa-Vicencio, 2003). However, the notion of restorative justice 
remained too far outside the scope of direct inquiry by many victims to achieve 
any chance for legal justice. That closing-the-book-scenario had to finish its active 
period without showing a further path to deal with unfinished business on justice. 
Secondly, the engagement by the people called ‘transitional take-over or change-
management group’ that was purported to change the track of the truth appeared 
through the TRC process even in the course of activities. Simply put, they will-
ingly participated in the process but with a different (or opposing) motive from 
the official one. The TRC, or TJ in general, has been pressured to acquire as 
many participants as possible to establish its legitimacy in society, but the par-
ticipants were not always tamed to the official calling, affecting the outcomes of 
the process in an unexpected manner. Thirdly, the group which overtly opposed 
the TRC’s direction has sought to narrow the range of the truth as much as 
possible. Thus, the result of official truth-seeking reflects the politics on truth- 
making, or memory politics (Manning, 2014: 38).
EXTERNAL BUT SUPPLEMENTARY ACTORS TO THE TRC: THINKING 
OF THE POST-TRC PHASE
The TRC had worked in such local politics, reacting to these dissident voices. 
Yet, partly because of the structural restriction of the resources as well as the 
uneven reactions, it could not achieve the public goal that enhanced the people’s 
expectations at the beginning. Thus, the critiques have indicated points to be 
accomplished in light of the officially announced objectives. The greater the expec-
tation of goal attainment, the deeper the resulting despondency when the goal is 
not attained. David Chidester (1999) claimed that the ideal of national reconcili-
ation had been transformed into a nationalistic discourse that might exclude the 
diverse experiences of individual victims. For example, the expected healing of 
a victim through public testimony was dismissed when locals called the public 
hearing a ‘circus’ that did not allow for a follow-up programme (Hayner, 2001: 
142). Although the primary objective of public truth-seeking is to search for the 
truth in any political dimension, Clair Moon has pointed out that the elimination 
of black-on-black violence—which occurred primarily between the Inkhatha Free-
dom Party (IFP) and the ANC in the early 1990s—from the TRC proceedings 
was an outcome of the commission’s internal demand that ‘fit within the broader 
morality tale the TRC sought to tell about South Africa’s past’ (2008: 77–78). 
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Although the TRC had cooperated with local nongovernmental organizations 
(NGOs), including churches, specifically for purposes of information dissemina-
tion and outreach as well as in hopes of settling on a public venue for open 
hearing, the scope of this cooperation has been criticised as insufficient (van der 
Merwe, 2003: 110–112; van der Merwe & Chapman, 2008). Considering the 
selection process of 17 TRC commissioners and the establishment of special 
women’s hearings, which were assigned an all-woman panel, civil society organ-
isations’ input into the TRC programme has undoubtedly been crucial. Yet these 
actions may have been restricted to the prefatory stages of the TRC process, thus 
resulting in the final negative assessment made by critiques such as that of van 
der Merwe et al.
However, in searching fora more holistic assessment and for the further ana-
lytical landscape after recognising the appearance of various local politics, this 
paper proposes another avenue for consideration of the external organisation to 
the TRC and its activities in the post-TRC phase. 
TJ in general needs to expand supporters among citizens during its work because 
it is not guaranteed to hold public legitimacy from the beginning partly because 
of its nature as a newly established organisation which has no comparable pre-
decessor in society. A politically unstable condition also functions as a negative 
factor to such a policy. As such, TJ would be more stable and active when acquir-
ing more supporters and participants to the project. Abe (2014) introduced this 
idea that TJ may well be unique compared with the character of a social move-
ment rather than with that of normal policy or governmental organisation in a 
relatively stable society. While recognising the catalytic character of TJ in illus-
trating the case of the Khulumani support group (see below), the argument did 
not sufficiently elaborate a specific approach of social movement theory to further 
draw a unique aspect of a TJ process. 
On this point, this paper specifically adopts the approach of propagation of 
movement repertoires when incorporating a social movement framework. A social 
movement is not just a genuine expression of complainants but a calculated col-
lective action, sometimes drawing on deliberate learning from prior movements. 
Information and episodes of movement in other areas are delivered and circulated 
among actors inside a movement. Thus, one can perhaps identify an action being 
successfully implemented at a different place from an original context where the 
project had finished in failure. Propagation is surely open to a change in perfor-
mance depending on the new situation, reminding us of the term syncretism in 
religious studies. The concept of propagation or diffusion of movement repertoire 
is useful in understanding the TJ body’s unique but informal influence on the 
concerned society. Charles Tilly used this term to describe a contentious demon-
stration taking place in the form of ‘a limited set of routines that are learned, 
shared, and acted out through a relatively deliberate process of choice’ (Tilly, 
1995: 26). Tilly has elaborated this term in analysing the political contentious 
actions in Burgundy province in France for the period of 300 years. A collective 
expression, properly accepted by many other fellows in a society, would then be 
mimicked by another party because this might enhance the capability to mobilise 
people. Knowledge and skill on how to frame an appeal and how to behave in 
14 Toshihiro ABE & Zenzile KHOISAN 
public will become a common currency among those who interact with or are 
inspired to action by a previously existing party that possesses this currency. One 
of contributions of this term to the social movement theory is that a movement 
tends to learn the skill and the know-how from the proceeding stock of reper-
toires of collective actions, rather than appearing from protestors’ philosophy or 
any abstract thinking. Using this framework, a TJ body is placed on the same 
ground as other social movement entities. By incorporating the term, this paper 
aims to bridge the TRC, or the incomplete aspects of TRC activities regarding 
official objectives such as national reconciliation, victim healing and public truth-
seeking, with other loosely connected external movements even if they might not 
be identified as a direct affiliate with the TRC.
This group, manifested by the survivor group Khulumani and organisations 
such as Jubilee 2000, the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation (IJR), the South 
African History Archive (SAHA), the Freedom of Expression Institute, the Miss-
ing Persons Task Team(MPTT), and many others, has been active after the end 
of the TRC’s work, demanding access to confidential documents, the memory 
projects, exhumation of remains, and the legal challenges for reparations in the 
post-TRC phase. Some of these groups have not only been implementing their 
activities outside the TRC’s official programme but even criticising the work of 
the TRC in the commission’s active period. However, being different from the 
three groups introduced in the previous section, this group demonstrates a unique-
ness in that it seems to pursue TRC’s objectives, which the TRC’s work has not 
been able to realise, by their own initiatives. Put another way, their work is sup-
plementary to the TRC, particularly in light of its unfinished business. We will 
trace the remarkable cases of such initiatives.  
I. Pursuit of Economic Justice
Abe (2014) focused on Khulumani, especially on its supplementary activities 
with the TRC work on victim empowerment. It began its work in 1995 at the 
time of the establishment of the TRC and grew to be the largest victims’ asso-
ciation in South Africa with more than 100,000 members (Kesselring, 2017: 27). 
Its participants were victimised in myriad ways: torture, detention without trial, 
sexual assault, abuse, harassment, mutilation of body parts, banning and banish-
ment by order, deliberate withholding of medical attention, denial of food and 
water, the destruction of homes, and loss of family members. Khulumani’s track 
of activities has expanded from the critical review of and lobbying for the TRC 
programme to its own direction, staging a play that focused on the tensions and 
contradictions in the TRC process. The propagation of movement repertoire was 
first shown in Khulumani members’ search for their own role as victims. The 
founders of the organisation realised that ‘the group never would have formed 
without the truth commission, though it has now taken on a life of its own’ 
(Hayner, 2001: 148). Khulumani thus formed initially as a positive derivative 
from the official institution, but over time it became closer and more tactically 
responsive to specific victims. The fact obviously denotes both Khulumani’s cur-
rent motive and programmes, particularly the ones having deployed after the end 
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of the TRC activities, can be recognised to be propagated repertories which the 
TRC originally created. The TRC had never planned to create such a supplemen-
tary branch or independently functioning unit; on the other hand, Khulumani did 
not appear out of thin air; the motivation for the movement and its repertoire of 
activities, particularly victim testimony at a public gathering, came in part from 
its predecessor. Once the TRC was identified as an incomplete space, the need 
for a complementary space became clear. Khulumani, sensitive to this need, 
developed its unique style in response. Kesselring (2017: 164) assesses 
Khulumani’s role among members as moulding their subjectivity: ‘By teaching 
members how to articulate their pain in public settings, the leadership plays a 
constitutive role in coding members’ victimhood.’
Meanwhile, the TRC’s most crucial unfinished business lay no doubt in justice 
issues pertaining to symbolic and financial reparations. Therefore, Khulumani and 
another group, Jubilee 2000, brought a lawsuit in U.S. Federal Court in New 
York in 2002 on behalf of victims of apartheid (Khulumani et al. v. Barclays 
National Bank et al., Case No. 02-CV5952, S.D.N.Y. 2002). The defendants were 
23 foreign multinational enterprises including British Petroleum, Shell Oil, 
Barclays, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, Ford Motors, and IBM; they were alleged 
to have aided and abetted the perpetration of gross human rights violations in 
South Africa by collaborating with the apartheid regime and providing military 
and other strategic equipment to its security agencies. President Thabo Mbeki 
expressed his strong opposition to the lawsuit in 2003, stating that it interfered 
with the ‘sovereign right to determine, according to internal political and consti-
tutional order, how best to address Apartheid’s legacy.’ In 2004, the banks and 
oil companies were freed from the case because ‘District Judge John Sprizzo said 
that no direct link could be proved between the firms’ actions during Apartheid 
and human rights violations of the era.’(18) South African Justice Minister Penuell 
Maduna affirmed this position, indicating to the U.S. District Court that the case 
should not be dealt with because it had the potential to discourage foreign invest-
ment in South Africa. However, the Zuma Government reversed its previous posi-
tion in September 2009 and expressed support for the lawsuit. When General 
Motors, which had declared bankruptcy and been reorganised in 2009, opted to 
settle the case with a payment of $1.5 million in 2012, Khulumani called on 
other defendant companies to follow suit. However, the remaining actors, Ford 
and IBM, were found by the U.S. District Court in August 2014 to be not respon-
sible for apartheid-era abuses. In July 2015, the 2nd U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals 
in New York dismissed the case because Ford’s South African subsidiary—not 
the U.S. company itself—had cooperated with the apartheid government and 
because it had not been proved that IBM had the clear purpose of supporting 
human rights abuses.(19)
The TRC has often been criticised for not bringing legal justice to victims, as 
typically illustrated by the decision by the family of Steve Biko to sue the TRC. 
Khulumani’s activity embodies an answer, in a twisted manner, to the fundamen-
tal scepticism towards the TRC’s ability to cope with justice issues in the past. 
Justice through the TRC process has also been explained as a form of restorative 
justice, but it does not fulfil the people’s expectation of a genuine legal justice. 
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However, the needs of victims eager for judicial outcomes could be dealt with 
by external organisation such as Khulumani than the TRC. The TRC need not 
monopolise the role to embody all the needs. It can work as a catalyst to another 
entity to develop its own agenda in propagation of the repertoire. This process 
of propagation might well be advanced even by the recognition of incomplete-
ness of the TRC because it makes ‘the need for an opposing space [become] 
clear’ (Abe, 2014: 19). 
II. Expanding Approach to the Right to Know
Having begun its work in the 1980s in close connection with the United Dem-
ocratic Front, the Congress of South African Trade Unions, and the ANC, the 
South African History Archive (SAHA) now operates as an independent human 
rights archive that specialises in documenting and publishing a broad range of 
information on the liberation movement, political transition, and freedom of infor-
mation in contemporary South Africa. Among its various projects, the following 
three are prominent in regard to the documentation of TRC activities. 
(1) The Preservation and Access to Records and Stories relating to the TRC 
is an archive established in 2006–2009 in cooperation with the Historical Papers 
of the University of the Witwatersrand Library. This archive is unique in light of 
its interpretation of TRC activities, which SAHA believes should expand to ‘the 
ever-shifting stories about the TRC carried by a myriad people,’ so that ‘internal 
records used by the TRC as well as external documentation of the TRC process 
by a wide range of individuals and organizations, within and outside of South 
Africa’ are required.(20)
Based on the idea of the TRC as a social phenomenon, the archive includes 
the following:
・ interviews with 63 individuals who worked for the Commission in various 
capacities and in different locales; 
・ the TRC’s Select Bibliography to the South African Truth and Reconciliation-
Commission Debate, identifying key published articles, books and book chap-
ters, theses, and online and audio-visual resources about the TRC, from con-
ception to aftermath; and 
・ digitised copies of key archival materials organised into five broad categories—
background, human rights violations, amnesty, reparations, and aftermath—with 
accompanying narratives, in an attempt to contextualise, compare, and contrast 
these archival fragments to enrich ‘social memory.’
(2) A digital web resource was launched in 2013 centring on the South Africa 
Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) television series Truth and Reconciliation Com-
mission Special Report, which comprised 87 episodes and was aired weekly from 
1996 to 1998. A multimedia platform containing all episodes of the series was 
created in conjunction with SABC Digital News and SABC Business Develop-
ment. Moreover, the episodes are linked to relevant sections of the TRC’s final 
report and other documents, ‘to form a seamless searchable resource intended to 
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make the work of the TRC more accessible and to support on-going transitional 
justice and reconciliation work in South Africa.’(21)  The project also digitised a 
collection of cartoons related to the TRC drawn by Zapiro between 1995 and 
2004.
(3) SAHA’s latest project was initiated in 2015 following the official release 
of TRC Section 29 records. The TRC conducted closed hearings, called Section 
29 hearings, at which those subpoenaed divulged the full extent of their knowl-
edge of gross human rights violations. Based on a freedom of information law 
passed in 2000, SAHA has repeatedly challenged the Department of Justice for 
access to the full transcripts of these hearings. SAHA’s requests in 2003, 2006, 
and 2009 were denied mainly because of concerns that releasing such informa-
tion would have a negative impact on cases being investigated and prosecuted 
by the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA). However, the NPA has prosecuted 
no cases related to Section 29 hearings since 2009; thus, in 2014 the department 
provided SAHA with 174 records from the hearings. The documents are the tran-
scripts of hearings conducted in-camera by the Truth and Reconciliation Com-
mission which were not open to the public. Many of the persons who testified 
under oath were summoned to the hearings under subpoena and were compelled 
to answer questions concerning their knowledge of events and persons associated 
with gross human rights abuses perpetrated by the primary forces who were party 
to the apartheid-era conflicts. Among those who appeared at these hearings were 
the top commanders of the former SADF and uMkhonto we Sizwe (MK, ANC’s 
armed unit), as also numerous covert players connected to structures that had 
authorised, initiated, aided, participated in or directly perpetrated human rights 
abuses. Former TRC investigative Unit head Dumisa Ntsebeza said ‘it was of 
utmost importance for the files to be accessible in the public domain, as these 
documents raise serious questions for the NPA about cases that were not followed 
up once the TRC closed its doors.’(22) In addition to publishing the full hearing 
records,(23) SAHA has been continuing to contact persons who interacted with 
Section 29 investigations. 
The TRC had gathered various information, yet it faced limitations in the time 
it could spend on human rights violations and perpetrations, which were defined 
as mandatory objectives in the TRC law. Therefore, not only the people who did 
not appear in an official conduit such as the TRC report or open hearings, but 
also the sacrifice, memory, and incidents, which were beyond the TRC’s mandate, 
have been left intact in the course of this official truth-producing. The SAHA has 
been incorporating such various fragments that were put outside the social con-
struction of official memory, while adopting a movement repertoire of the TRC 
that gathers information of damage in the apartheid era from any social strata 
and opens it. To encourage people to debate freely on the outcomes of the TRC 
activities, Mandela stated in his 1998 speech that the TRC would not be an offi-
cial repository of the past, so the SAHA has been addressing the vision of the 
TRC in its own way, although the way was unforeseeable even for the insider 
staff of the TRC. 
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III. Continuous Follow-up Research on Reconciliation
The Institute for Justice and Reconciliation (IJR) is a Cape Town-based NGO 
established in 2001 under the patronage of Desmond Tutu; its first director was 
the former head of the TRC’s research unit, Charles Villa-Vicencio. As of 2017, 
three former TRC commissioners serve on its board of directors: Pumla Gobodo-
Madikizela, Dumisa Ntsebeza, and Glenda Wildschut. Among the projects imple-
mented by the IJR related to community healing, youth leadership, and arts and 
culture, its Reconciliation Barometer Survey warrants particular note. To under-
stand the status of progress towards reconciliation, the IJR has conducted ‘an 
annual national public opinion poll that measures citizen attitudes towards recon-
ciliation, transformation and national unity’ by means of six main indicators: 
human security, political culture, cross-cutting political relations, race relations, 
historical confrontation, and dialogue.(24) Particularly in terms of race relations, 
the IJR’s Reconciliation Barometer 2014 Report provided contradictory but sig-
nificant survey data for the 10 years since the TRC’s final report was published. 
This report compelled a reconsideration of the meaning of reconciliation and of 
people’s complex perceptions of reconciliation in the context of their everyday 
lives.
The IJR’s survey on ‘Interracial Talk and Socialisation across Race Lines’ illus-
trated a gradual increase in socialising and talking with other racial groups, even 
though the curve of the graph is modest (Wale, 2014: 21). One related result, on 
interracial mistrust by race, portrayed a positive trend in that more respondents, 
both white and black, have described other groups as more trustworthy (Wale, 
2014: 17). Notably, people of Asian (Indian) and Coloured identities have main-
tained their vigilance towards other groups (a sense of trust in others has low 
status), which was once reflected by their relative indifference to or distancing 
from the TRC proceedings in the 1990s. This finding calls for more consideration 
of the collective tendency towards national reconciliation. Also notable was that 
Coloured people dramatically showed their collective disappointment in interracial 
relationships with nearly 70% desiring interracial talk in 2003, but only 20% 
doing so in 2013, while the other three groups remained around 20% to 30% 
over that period. Moreover, the percentage favouring the ‘desirability and possi-
bility of creating one united South Africa,’ an idea directly related to the sense 
of national identity or the nation-building project, has been steadily declining, 
thus demonstrating a gradual trend towards living together separately (Wale, 2014: 
16). The report cautioned against a quick assessment of this data, pointing out 
that it ‘could mean either that South Africans are indeed becoming less keen 
about the idea of a unified nation, or it may also suggest disillusionment with 
the interpretation of the concept of unity and nationhood as used in our political 
discourse’ (Wale, 2014: 20).
In any case, these trends, such as greater communication among racial groups 
in general, specific groups’ cautious stances towards other groups, and an appar-
ent need to search for another model than that of national reconciliation based 
on a shared sense of ‘us,’ call for a fresh evaluation of the TRC’s work and 
impact. This IJR survey effectively illustrates the complex situation of post-TRC 
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South Africa. 
Moreover, this is the only follow-up survey that has been conducted with 
chronological consistency around the TRC ideal of national reconciliation, as TJ 
organisations usually do not receive long-term evaluations, although longer-term 
impacts are arguably the only way to judge how a society has incorporated the 
legacy of TJ activities. Spontaneous involvement in such unfinished business is 
not officially controlled by an institutional TJ entity, including the TRC, yet that 
unplanned development is crucial from a longer-term perspective to positively 
interpret feedback on the TJ initiatives and advance new social policies.
IV. Exhumation as Reparatory Service
An actor in a movement that diverges from the TRC can sometimes follow a 
somewhat twisted path. In South Africa, even though then-President Nelson 
Mandela was a strong proponent of the TRC, other younger politicians within 
the ANC were sceptical and maintained a distance from the mainstream of the 
TRC. Those politicians, called ‘the transitional take-over or change-management 
group,’ were inclined towards more pragmatic positions in terms of redistribution 
of social resources and reparation policy. They even boycotted the publication 
ceremony of the TRC report in 1998. Looking back at these reactions, one gets 
the impression that the ANC body has never cooperated with TRC programmes 
substantially, even opposing and undermining their legitimacy. 
Yet some years after the end of the TRC, another governmental unit became 
an actor in an inquiry regarding missing persons. Aronson (2011: 262) traced 
these ‘efforts to account for missing persons from the apartheid era in South 
Africa by family members, civil society organizations and the National Prosecu-
tion Authority (NPA)’s MPTT, which emerged out of the Truth and Reconcilia-
tion Commission process.’ Curiously, this movement has not been supported by 
a local ANC branch. 
The families of the Mamelodi Four (four ANC operatives who were tortured 
to death by apartheid security police) first learned about their lost family mem-
bers at the TRC amnesty hearings and then testified at the hearings of the Human 
Rights Violations Committee in 1996, ‘where they not only told their stories but 
also demanded information about their missing loved ones and return of the 
remains so that they could perform appropriate burial rituals’ (Aronson, 2011: 
270). However, after their testimony, the TRC did not contact them. The inves-
tigation of missed persons was thus left as unfinished business, leading to the 
TRC’s recommendation to launch any follow-up entity. In 2004, this recommen-
dation resulted in the establishment of the MPTT in the Priority Crimes 
Litigation Unit in the NPA. The MPTT started examining the suspected remains 
of the disappeared in the Winterveld cemetery and confirmed their identities with 
DNA tests. Following that, in 2005, the relatives received remains from the MPTT 
consisting of fragmented hip and leg bones. They reburied them at the local cem-
etery in Mamelodi (Aronson, 2011: 270). This is another story of victim empow-
erment that happened on a divergent track from the mainstream programme of 
the TRC. It is interesting because the MPTT was on the side of the ANC gov-
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ernment, which had been opposing the TRC for years on contentious issues, such 
as the responsibility of the liberation movement for civilian losses or reparations 
to victims. However, a space for political appeal and manoeuvring remains:
These stories tend to be framed in terms of heroism, both of the missing, 
who are said to have died in service to their country, and of justice finally 
being served after decades without any resolution. Headlines like “Heroes 
‘Return’ to Motherland,” “ANC Hero Saved from an Unmarked Grave” and 
“Former MK Cadres to Get a Hero’s Welcome” illustrate this narrative 
device well. … Madeleine Fullard, head of the MPTT, openly acknowledges 
that the exhumations carried out by her team tend to be weighted in favour 
of ANC and MK figures. (Aronson, 2011: 272) 
A government is not an innocent entity, and we should not overlook the ques-
tion of political will. Prioritising ANC/MK cadres in exhumation programme to 
other freedom fighters such as PAC and APLA would serve to reinforce a spe-
cific political position.
However, such political bias and manoeuvring is not really the essence of fam-
ilies’ experiences. Maria Ntuli, mother of Jeremiah, one of the Mamelodi Four 
victims, said that no remains with DNA matched her children, but she was sat-
isfied with the burial ceremony for others. Katherine Magagula thanked the team 
for its dedicated information sharing, even though no positive DNA results were 
found for her child either. Photographs of the crime scene obtained from security 
police were provided to those families, and an opportunity to examine the mor-
tuary records was provided. Even a forensic anthropologist gave a presentation 
to the families at their request (Aronson, 2011: 274). 
These reactions by the MPTT may not have been planned from the beginning. 
Yet, when confronted by the fact that no valid DNA records were found for some 
participating families, the team created an agenda to meet those families’ needs. 
Lizzie Selofo, wife of Harold Sefolo of the Mamelodi Four, recalled the experi-
ence of witnessing the exhumation as a chance to become part of the investiga-
tion process rather than being passive recipients of information (Aronson, 2011: 
274).
A further complication is that the families who appreciated the MPTT’s work 
criticised the responsibility or follow-up efforts of the local ANC branch that was 
in charge of memorialisation and reburial. In other words, the MPTT, an ANC 
government agency, offered valued service to families on its own initiative, while 
local ANC bodies were rather reluctant and ‘did not even bother to inform the 
community that a reburial of formerly missing MK comrades would be taking 
place at the cemetery’ (Aronson, 2011: 278). This exhumation project resulted 
from the efforts of one unit within an ANC government that was opposed to the 
TRC’s proceedings, while the local ANC bodies were largely unsupportive of the 
families or the ceremony. We see here that a positive divergence from a TJ pro-
gramme can emerge from a government agency, not just from a civil society 
organisation or social movement, although we must offer some reservations about 
the possible political utilisation of such an event.
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V. Divergent but Supplemental Activities 
These groups’ activities to some extent diverged from and interacted with the 
TRC’s (incomplete) activities. Each initiative represents economic justice 
(Khulumani), right to know (SAHA), following-up on reconciliation attempts (IJR), 
and exhumation as reparatory service (MPTT) in a post-TRC stage. Even though 
these initiatives are not directly counted as TRC programmes, they need to be 
connected to the TRC activities in terms of the propagation of movement reper-
toire because all of them are topics that were expected to be embodied through 
the TRC process. 
The characteristic nature of these activities is their spontaneous divergence from 
the TRC programme because these groups recognise the TRC’s limits, while still 
affirming that the ideals and aims of TRC are themselves good. Such groups 
came into being with the TRC initiative but became aware that they were replac-
ing or supplementing it in terms of completing the tasks expected of a TJ 
programme by victims. Without a doubt, appearances by these organisations were 
not planned in the TRC’s official mandate. The TRC could not necessarily sup-
port the work of these organisations because sometimes they were critical of its 
inadequate implementation of expected tasks. On the other hand, these activities 
would not occur if the TRC was perfect, because people who are already satis-
fied with the TRC will have no motivation to engage in unfinished business. 
These circumstances indicate that the core actors in such movements are 
people who feel disappointed, have complaints, or are even angry with official 
programmes while agreeing with the TRC’s official ideals. They may develop the 
repertoires that have been demonstrated in the TRC process. Given the possible 
shift of agenda items from the TRC to other movement bodies, raising locals’ 
expectations with highly promising ideals and goals should not simply be dis-
missed as unrealistic, even though such a strategy cannot always insist on its 
legitimacy as long as the official appeal may still leave space for the spontane-
ous engagement of locals who attempt to fill in the gap between official words 
and their expectations. Put another way, an evaluation of the TRC can be imple-
mented in a broader manner, incorporating the activities that diverge from official 
programmes.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper began to set the direction of its argument, by incorporating one of 
the recent arguments in TJ studies. It emphasises local perception and reaction 
to an official TRC programmes, particularly taking the different path from the 
success/failure debate. The first step to looking back and re-configuring the activ-
ities of the South African TRC is to map the main local politics of the TRC’s 
truth-seeking. Various groups, which had participated in the TRC process with 
dissident motives, negatively contributed to leaving unfinished business of the 
TRC. Yet, if one observes the longer-term influence of the reconciliatory project, 
this unfinished business from such politics can be re-identified as a source for 
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other movements in the post-TRC stage. Incorporating the idea of the propaga-
tion of movement repertoires has merit for deepening an understanding of local 
reactions to and social perceptions of the TRC. It helps deploy an argument con-
cerning locals’ nuanced reactions to the TRC outside the success/failure debate.
The mobilisation does not necessarily cause a positive reaction among locals, 
yet another type of local action appropriates, imitates or develops an official pro-
gramme for its own interests and objectives. If we were concentrating only on 
the internal activities of the TRC process, we would overlook these events. By 
contrast, if we were to take the view that a TRC resonates with the public posi-
tion of a social movement, which lacks established authority in society, then a 
TRC’s ideal or motive implemented in a different place would be a subject for 
further inquiry. Local actors do not always respond directly to the official invita-
tion for mobilisation. The TRC, and TJ in general, had no plan to generate local 
derivatives from its own official programmes. However, when a similar motive, 
a developed programme or a more contextualised activity is deployed at an indi-
rectly related space in the society concerned, these appearances can be captured 
by the term propagation of repertoires. Incomplete outcomes of the TRC activi-
ties indirectly functioned as a soil for such propagation.
In referring to urban context in the current South Africa, Francis Nyamnjoh 
introduced the concepts of incompleteness and conviviality as a compass for those 
who coexist, or conflict. For him, incompleteness of others should rather be cap-
tured as a potential towards conviviality by balancing negotiation between ‘the 
incompleteness of the past and the present in the interest of a non-linear future’ 
(Nyamnjoh, 2015: 14). We can receive his message on the function of incom-
pleteness not only in a context of conflicting neighbours but in the issues around 
TRC, or TJ, in our argument. The notion of others, who might elicit an actor’s 
moment towards conviviality, can include the TRC. The TRC’s incomplete pro-
grammes in specific manners have been variously criticised, however, when the 
local actors turned out to be the subjects who negotiate such incompleteness, the 
stock of incompleteness then turned out to be a flexible repertoire. The TRC’s 
unexpected legacy has thus been propagated. 
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NOTES
(1) Public hearings composed of the following categories: Victim Hearing, Amnesty Hear-
ing, Event Hearing, Special Hearing, and Institutional Hearing. The two predominant 
hearings were Victim Hearings and Amnesty Hearings. There was typically no opportu-
nity for dialogue between victim and perpetrator in a Victim Hearing. Each witness was 
given 30 minutes of testimony in question-answer format in hearings led by TRC com-
missioners. Victim Hearings were held at 63 venues around the country, for three or four 
days at each venue.
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(2) Dumisa Ntsebeza, the ex-TRC commissioner, indicated in the book that the matter of 
reconciliation ‘between beneficiaries (mostly white people) and victims (mostly black 
people)’ is ‘the unfinished business of the TRC’ (Bell & Ntsebeza, 2003: 349).
(3) Former president of Serbia (1989–1997) and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (1997–
2000).
(4) Compomiso historico is a term that comes from the Spanish civil war and has been 
within the parlance of the South Africa political theatre since the late seventies when 
there were signs that some forces within the broad liberation movement and internal 
mass uprising were advocating for some sort of engagement with the apartheid state in 
order to reach some sort of agreement that would guarantee a sort of check mate, where 
there is no clear victory by either side, but a situation is created where both side to the 
conflict can sell something to their constituencies which would be somehow, at a mini-
mum, acceptable. This was then highlighted, particularly by those who came out of the 
Black Consciousness Movement such as Johnny Issel as a “sell out” idea.
(5) Submission to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission by Mr F W De Klerk, Leader 
of the National Party, 1997, http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/hrvtrans/submit/np_truth.htm 
(Accessed on 1 October 2017) 
(6) Statement by Nelson Mandela on receiving Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
Report (29 October 1998), http://www.mandela.gov.za/mandela_speeches/1998/981029_
trcreport.htm (Accessed on 1 October 2017).
(7) Richard Goldstone, ‘Lest we Forget…Expose the Crimes of Apartheid,’ Mail and 
Guardian, 13 May 1994.
(8) Nelson Mandela’s speech can be accessed at www.mandela.gov.za/mandela_speech-
es/1998/981029_trcreport.htm (Accessed on 1 October 2017)).
(9) National Assembly, 29 May 1998.
(10) The ANC released a statement just prior to approaching court to indict the TRC final 
report: ‘The ANC has consistently sought a meeting with the TRC to discuss the Com-
mission’s contemplated findings against it—as contained in the letter sent to it on 24 
August 1998… This morning we received a letter from the TRC informing us that the 
Commission has again declined our request for a hearing. It also became clear to us that 
the Commission had not taken into account the ANC’s written submission before finalis-
ing its report …. In view of the TRC’s persistent refusal of the ANC’s request for a hear-
ing to discuss the Commission’s contemplated findings against it, the ANC was left with 
only one option—to ask the court to compel the TRC to act in accordance with the law. 
… The ANC has thus decided to lodge an urgent court interdict to stop publication of the 
TRC’s report’ (ANC statement on urgent court interdict against the TRC, Issued by ANC 
Department of Information and Publicity, http://www.anc.org.za/content/anc-statement-
urgent-court-interdict-against-trc (Accessed on 1 October 2017)).
(11) DOJ is legally a custodian of TRC documents, yet, the documents are physically located 
at the National Archives. DOJ, NIA and the National Archives, in 2001, formed a com-
mittee which would deal with the related issues such as management of, or, access to 
these records (Pigou, 2009: 19).
(12) SAHA director Catherine Kennedy, Interviewed by Zenzile Khoisan (April 2015).
(13) The vast TRC archives over 3,000 cubic metres had been transferred to the National 
Archives in Pretoria until 2003, however, the documents are unprocessed and inacces-
sible to the public (Pigou, 2009: 18).
(14) Her husband, an Afrikaner anti-apartheid activist Marius Schoon, was the target of letter 
bombing, however, Jeannette Schoon and her daughter at the age of six were killed on 28 
June 1984. The letter was sent by a former secret agent of the security police, Craig 
Williamson. The TRC granted amnesty to him.
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(15) Apartheid enforcer sticks to ‘farcical’ story on Biko killing (Independent, 10 September 
1997), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/apartheid-enforcer-sticks-to-farcical-story-
on-biko-killing-1238495.html (Accessed on 22 April 2017)
(16) The TRC plainly admitted that ‘the Commission was restricted to examining only a frac-
tion of the totality of human rights violations that emanated from the policy of apartheid’ 
(Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 1998: 29) although the covered period would be 
understood to be ‘the worst and…the bloodiest in the long and violent history…’ (Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission, 1998: 24). The TRE report began its contents from the 
historical remarks dated back to 1652 (Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 1998: 25). 
At the preparation stage of the TRC, the ‘1960 cut-off date chosen by legislators’ was 
roughly approximated ‘to the period at which the apartheid state turned unabashedly to 
the view that only traitors could differ with it over fundamental policy matters, including 
the basic human rights of voteless black people’ (Asmal et al., 1996: 9).
(17) The term Vlakplaas originally designates a farm near Pretoria where the South African 
Police counterinsurgency unit placed its headquarters. Yet the term has generally been 
used to indicate the paramilitary hit squad against political opponents.
(18) Daily Maverick, 22 August 2013, http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/201308-22-us-
corporations-cant-be-sued-for-apartheid-court-rules/#.VhfzwnLotjp (Accessed on 10 
October 2016).
(19) See Sarah A. Altschuller, ‘Alien Tort Case Development: Second Circuit Affirms Dis-
missal of Claims against Ford and IBM,’ 31 July 2016, http://www.csrandthelaw.
com/2015/07/31/alien-tort-case-development-second-circuit-affirms-dismissal-of-
claims-against-ford-and-ibm/ (Accessed on 31 July, 2016).
(20) See the SAHA web page. http://www.saha.org.za/projects/trc_archive_project.htm, 
(Accessed on 9 April 2017).
(21) SABC News, 1 March 2013, http://www.sabc.co.za/news/a/4e60d7004eba3c4291b2fb7
da4cd6ad7/SABC,-SAHA-launch-TRC-website-20130103 (Accessed on 9 April 2017).
(22) Zenzile Khoisan, ‘TRC files reveal damning truth,’ IOL News, 12 April 2015, https://
www.iol.co.za/news/politics/trc-files-reveal-damning-truth-1843834 (Accessed on 20 
September 2017).
(23) The full records detail the following events and issues: the Helderberg disaster inquiry, 
after 159 people died when a South African Airways plane exploded in mid-air near 
Mauritius in 1987; the Mandela United Football Club and Winnie Madikizela-Mandela’s 
knowledge of its activities; the incrimination of Joe Mamasela, a notorious Vlakplaasas-
kari (a secret agent of the apartheid security force who infiltrated the ANC), in the abduc-
tion of the Pebco Three; and the deaths of anti-apartheid activists such as Rick Turner 
and Griffiths Mxenge. http://www.saha.org.za/news/2010/March/trcs_secret_hearing_
transcripts_handed_over_to_saha.htm (Accessed on 9 October 2016).
(24) Quoted from the IJR website: http://reconciliationbarometer.org/wp-content/ 
uploads/2014/12/IJR-SA-Reconciliation-Barometer-Report-2014.pdf (Accessed on 27 
January 2017).
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